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Navajo Nation v. United States Department of the Interior, No. CV-03-
00507-PCT-GMS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143801, 2019 WL 3997370 
(D. Ariz. Aug. 23, 2019) 
 
Adam W. Johnson 
 
 The Navajo Nation sued the United States government alleging 
the government breached its trust obligation over the allocation of water 
rights in the Colorado River Basin. On remand, the district court denied 
the Navajo Nation leave to file its third amended complaint for futility, 
holding that the general trust relationship was insufficient to support the 
Nation’s breach of trust claim. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Navajo Nation v. Department of the Interior involves a long-run-
ning quarrel concerning challenges to the Department of  the Interior’s 
(“Interior”) “shortage” and “surplus” guidelines for allocation of water 
from the Colorado River.1 The Navajo Nation (“Nation”) sued under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), claiming that Interior’s guidelines 
violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) by failing to 
protect the Nation’s water rights. 2  Additionally, the Nation alleged a 
breach of the federal government’s trust responsibility for (1) “failing to 
determine the quantities and sources of water required to make the Navajo 
Reservation a permanent homeland for the Navajo people” and (2) “failing 
to protect the sovereign interests of the Navajo Nation by securing an ad-
equate water supply to meet those homeland purposes.3 
After dismissing the Nation’s NEPA suit for lack of standing, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to 
the United States District Court for the District of Arizona to consider the 
merits of the breach of trust claim.4 The district court then held the Nation 
failed to establish the existence of a fiduciary duty and the general trust 
responsibility was inadequate to support a breach of trust claim.5 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Nation is a federally recognized Indian tribe with a reserva-
tion covering thirteen million acres in parts of Arizona, New Mexico, and 
 
1. Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of the Interior, No. CV-03- 
00507-PCT-GMS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143801, 2019 WL 3997370, at *5 (D. 
Ariz. Aug. 23, 2019) [hereinafter “Navajo Nation II”]. 
2. Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of the Interior, 876 F.3d 1144, 1159 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (referencing Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 34 F. Supp. 3d 
1019 (D. Ariz. 2014)) [hereinafter “Navajo Nation I”]. 
3. Navajo Nation II, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7 (internal citations 
omitted). 
4. Navajo Nation I, 876 F. 3d at 1174. 
5. Navajo Nation II, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *24. 
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Utah.6 The Nation—“the largest riparian landowner” apart from the fed-
eral government—“occupies vast reservation lands along the Colorado 
River but has no judicially decreed rights in its waters.”7 Interior regulates 
the “control, storage, and delivery” of the waters of the Colorado River to 
various western states.8 Facing droughts and increasing demands for water, 
Interior published guidelines in 2001 and 2008 clarifying how it would 
allocate water in both “surplus” and “shortage” years.9 In 2001, Interior 
adopted the Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines ("Surplus Guide-
lines"), which would "determine the conditions under which the Secretary 
would declare the availability of surplus water for use within" the states 
located in the Lower Basin of the Colorado River, as well as how that 
water would be allocated.10  
The adoption of the Surplus Guidelines “coincided with the driest 
eight-year period in the recorded history of the River.”11 Accordingly, in 
2008, Interior adopted criteria for when and how Interior would declare a 
shortage and “implemented procedures for the coordinated operation of 
the Lake Mead and Lake Powell reservoirs in times of low water and short-
age.”12 
In its comments on the draft environmental impact study for the 
guidelines, the Nation objected to both the Surplus and Shortage Guide-
lines, calling them “deeply and fatally flawed.”13 Specifically, the Nation 
claimed that the guidelines “did not account for its unquantified rights in 
the Lower Basin and fostered reliance by third parties on water to which 
it was, or would or could be, entitled.”14  
The Nation filed its original complaint in March 2003, first claim-
ing that Interior’s “failure to adequately consider and protect the Nation's 
rights to, and interest in, water violated [NEPA].”15 The Nation also as-
serted that Interior breached its trust obligation to the tribe by failing to 
protect its water rights.16 With the parties jointly seeking a settlement, the 
 




10. Id. at 1157 (quoting Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 
Fed. Reg.  7,772, 7,773 (Jan. 25, 2001)). 
11. Id. at 1158 (citing Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower  
Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead, 73 
Fed. Reg. 19,873 (Apr. 11, 2008)). 
12.  Id. (citing Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin 
Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 19,873, 19,874 (Apr. 11, 2008)). 
13.  Id. (quoting Final Environmental Impact Statement: Colorado River 
Interim Surplus Criteria, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION B-
187, B-196 (Nov. 2007)). 
14.  Id. (quoting Final Environmental Impact Statement: Colorado River 
Interim Surplus Criteria, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION B-
187–B-190 (Nov. 2007)). 
15.  Id. at 1159. 
16.  Id. 
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court agreed to stay the proceedings.17 After lengthy negotiations proved 
unsuccessful, the court lifted the stay, and the Nation amended its com-
plaint to add a challenge to the Shortage Guidelines.18 However, the dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, “holding that the 
Nation lacked Article III standing to bring its NEPA claims and that its 
breach of trust claim was barred by sovereign immunity.”19  
Upon review, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the 
NEPA claim for lack of standing but reversed the district court’s ruling 
that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity, instead holding that the 
breach of trust claim could proceed under the broad waiver of sovereign 
immunity in § 702 of the APA.20 The case was remanded to the district 
court to “consider fully the Nation’s breach of trust claim in the first in-
stance, after entertaining any request to amend the claim more fully to 
flesh it out.”21  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
 On remand, the district court considered the Nation’s Renewed 
Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint.22 The court began by 
laying out the legal standard for leave for permissive amendments, stating 
that while leave should be granted liberally, it should be denied if the pro-
posed amendment would prove futile.23 “An amendment is futile when no 
set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would 
constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.”24 
 In its proposed amended complaint, the Nation alleged that Inte-
rior violated its trust obligations “(1) by failing to determine the quantities 
and sources of water required to make the Navajo Reservation a permanent 
homeland for the Navajo people, and (2) by failing to protect the sovereign 
interests of the Navajo Nation by securing an adequate water supply to 
meet those homeland purposes.” 25  Interior insisted that the proposed 
amendments were futile, because “[t]he mere existence of a trust relation-
ship between the United States and the Navajo Nation is, by itself, an in-
sufficient basis for an actionable claim.”26  
 The court then discussed Indian trust relationship caselaw, noting 
that while a trust relationship exists between Indian tribes and the federal 
government,27 that relationship is general in nature and is not equivalent 
 
17.  Id. at 1160. 
18.  Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 1173. 
21. Id. 
22. Navajo Nation II, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *6. 
23. Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).  
24. Id. (quoting Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 656  
(9th Cir. 2017)). 
25. Id. at *7 (internal citations omitted). 
26. Id. (quoting Doc. 369 at 4). 
27. Id. (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17, 8 L. 
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to a private trust that creates specific fiduciary duties.28 For a valid breach 
of trust claim, a tribe must "identify a substantive source of law that estab-
lishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the Government 
has failed to perform those duties."29 Thus, the law required the Nation to 
“point to a specific treaty, agreement, executive order, statute, or regula-
tion that the government violated in order to bring a breach of trust claim, 
even one for injunctive relief rather than money damages.”30 The court 
then considered whether the Nation had met this standard in its claimed 
substantive sources of a fiduciary duty.31 
 
A.  Treaty and Winters Rights 
 
The court first examined whether a specific trust responsibility 
arose from a combination of treaties signed between the Nation and the 
United States—and the Supreme Court’s decision in Winters v. United 
States.32 The Winters Court held that, in entering into a treaty, the United 
States impliedly reserves enough water appurtenant to the reservation to 
make it fit for its purpose of operating as a functioning home of the tribe.33 
The Nation signed numerous treaties with the United States, creating the 
Navajo Reservation and placing the Nation under its exclusive jurisdiction 
and protection.34 Therefore, the Nation argued that under Winters, and 
through its treaties, the Unites States has a fiduciary duty to “(1) determine 
the quantities and sources of water required to make the Navajo Reserva-
tion a permanent homeland for the Navajo people, and (2) protect the sov-
ereign interests of the Navajo Nation by securing an adequate water supply 
to meet those homeland purposes.”35 
The district court disagreed for two reasons. First, the court held 
that Winters “only applies in certain situations: it only reserves water to 
the extent it is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation, and 
it only reserves water if it is appurtenant to the withdrawn land."36 The 
court found that the water at issue was not sufficiently geographically ap-
purtenant to the Navajo Reservation for the Winters doctrine to apply.37 It 
noted that recent Ninth Circuit caselaw has interpreted the word “appurte-
nant” for Winters doctrine purposes to be a strict geographical limitation 
 
Ed. 25 (1831)). 
28. Id. (citing United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 
173 (2011)). 
29. Id. at *8 (quoting United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506 
(2003)). 
30. Id. at *10.  
31. Id.  
32. Id. 
33. Id. at *11 (citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908)). 
34. Id. at *12 (quoting Treaty with the Navaho, 1849, Sept. 9, 1849, 9  
Stat. 974)). 
35. Id. at *13 (internal quotations omitted). 
36. Id. at *14 (quoting Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v.  
Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2017)). 
37. Id. at *14–15. 
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and not a more flexible legal concept as it was previously considered.38 
Second, the court held that even to the extent that the Nation possessed 
implied water rights in the Colorado River, the existence of such  rights 
was insufficient to create the sort of broad enforceable trust duties that the 
Nation claimed, reiterating that "[t]he Government assumes Indian trust 
responsibilities only to the extent it expressly accepts those responsibilities 
by statute."39 
  
B.  Other Sources of a Trust Duty 
 
Having rejected the Nation’s claims regarding its Winters and 
treaty rights, the court next considered a number of other potential sources 
of a trust obligation.40 The court first elaborated on the trust obligation 
standard established in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation.41 In 1980, 
the Supreme Court held that the language of the General Allotment Act, 
which required the Unites States to hold allotted land “in trust,” was not 
sufficiently specific to create enforceable fiduciary duties regarding man-
agement of the Quinalt Indian Nation’s timber resources.42 However, the 
Court later held that subsequent statutes were sufficiently specific to create 
those enforceable obligations.43 For example, there were statutes which 
specifically “required the government to manage Indian forest resources, 
obtain revenue through that management, and pay the proceeds to the 
tribal landowners.”44  
The court then turned to the sources of law that the Nation claimed 
created an enforceable trust obligation, finding each one of them lacking 
the specificity that the Supreme Court has required. For instance, the Na-
tion pointed to language in the Indian Health Care Amendments of 1988, 
which states that “it is in the interest of the United States, and it is the 
policy of the United States, that all Indian communities and Indian homes, 
new and existing, be provided with safe and adequate water supply sys-
tems . . . .”45 However, the court held that this language “merely sets forth 
a policy position” and did not create a specific duty.46  Similarly, The 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 imposes a duty of the “utmost good faith” 
when dealing with Indian tribes but establishes no specific duties.47 
 
38. Id. at n.3. 
39. Id. at *16 (quoting United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 
U.S. 162, 177 (2011)). 
40.  Id.   
41.  Id. at *17 (citing 564 U.S. 162 (2011)). 
42. Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 542  
(1980)). 
43. Id. at *18 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224–25 
(1983)). 
44. Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 219–23 
(1983)). 
45. Id. at *19 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1632 (2018)). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at *22 (citing Government of the North-West Territory provided 
for.; Chapter VIII, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789)). 
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The Nation also pointed to the Snyder Act48 and the American In-
dian Trust Management Reform Act of 1994.49 The Snyder Act directs the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs to "direct, supervise, and expend such moneys as 
Congress may from time to time appropriate, for the benefit, care, and as-
sistance of the Indians throughout the United States . . . for the develop-
ment of water supplies.50 The American Indian Trust Management Reform 
Act of 1994 requires that the federal government “appropriately manag[e] 
the natural resources located within the boundaries of Indian reservations 
and trust lands.”51 Despite this language, the court held that neither act 
“require[s] the United States to analyze the extent of the Nation's water 
needs and secure water rights on its behalf.”52  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The United States District Court for the District of Arizona inter-
preted Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent to bar the Nation’s 
breach of trust claim because the Nation failed to point to any statutes cre-
ating specific, enforceable trust duties, and “[t]he general trust relationship 
between the Nation and the United States [wa]s insufficient to support the 
Nation's breach of trust claim.”53 Accordingly, the court denied the Na-
tion’s Renewed Motion to for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint 







48.  25 U.S.C. § 13 (2018). 
49. Pub. L. 103-412, 108 Stat. 4239 (1994).  
50. Navajo II, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at * 22 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 13 
(2018)). 
51. Id. at *23 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(8) (2018)). 
52. Id.  
53. Id. at *24. 
54. Id. 
